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Abstract: There has been considerable recent interest in methods of determining sample size 
for qualitative research a priori, rather than through an adaptive approach such as saturation. 
Extending previous literature in this area, we identify four distinct approaches to determining 
sample size in this way: rules of thumb, conceptual models, numerical guidelines derived 
from empirical studies, and statistical formulae. Through critical discussion of these 
approaches, we argue that each embodies one or more questionable philosophical or 
methodological assumptions, namely: a naïve realist ontology; a focus on themes as 
enumerable ‘instances’, rather than in more conceptual terms; an incompatibility with an 
inductive approach to analysis; inappropriate statistical assumptions in the use of formulae; 
and an unwarranted assumption of generality across qualitative methods. We conclude that, 
whilst meeting certain practical demands, determining qualitative sample size a priori is an 
inherently problematic approach, especially in more interpretive models of qualitative 
research.   
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Introduction 
Curtis et al (2000, p. 1002) note that sampling in qualitative research ‘needs to be addressed 
rigorously and is fundamental to our understanding of the validity of qualitative research’, but 
also suggest that it is a topic that has received insufficient attention in comparison to methods 
of data collection and analysis. Recently, however, the question of sample size in qualitative 
research has become a topical issue, with a number of papers debating whether the number of 
participants sampled in a given study should be decided upon a priori, and if so, the number 
of participants that is indicated. Clearly, there is often a perceived need to indicate sample 
size in advance of, or at the outset of, a qualitative research project. This may be in order to 
meet the demands of research funders or ethics committees, or simply to plan the resources 
for the study. Accordingly, a number of writers have addressed means of determining sample 
size for qualitative research a priori – particularly in relation to interview or focus group 
studies. 
These attempts have at times, however, been challenged by those arguing that such a 
priori sample size decisions are incompatible with conceptual and methodological notions 
underpinning qualitative research. An edited collection by Baker and Edwards (2012) sought 
views from a range of researchers, primarily within the social sciences, as to the optimum 
sample size in qualitative research. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this was met with an 
overwhelming response of ‘it depends’, with a range contributing factors cited, including 
methodological considerations such as the nature and purpose of the individual study and the 
epistemological stance underpinning it, but also practical considerations around time and 
resources. This perhaps further highlights the competing priorities that are at play when 
making sampling decisions in qualitative research; i.e. the need to satisfy practical 
requirements of indicating sample size in advance, whilst at the same time seeking to adopt a 
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sampling approach that is in keeping with the methodological considerations pertinent to the 
particular study.  
A more recent, and particularly spirited, discussion of these issues centred on a paper 
by Fugard and Potts (2015a), in which a statistical calculation of sample size for qualitative 
research is proposed. A back-and-forth debate ensued within the pages of this journal, with 
responses from Emmel (2015), Hammersley (2015), Byrne (2015), Braun and Clarke (2016) 
and Fugard and Potts (2015b, 2016). Prominent among these critiques was the argument that 
determining sample size a priori is inherently problematic in qualitative research, given that 
sample size is often adaptive and emergent, and – particularly if based on a grounded theory 
approach – adopts the principle of saturation. Saturation is operationalized in different ways 
(Saunders et al, 2017), but broadly speaking it guides data collection and/or analysis either in 
terms of ‘informational redundancy’ (Sandelowski, 2008, p.875) or in relation to the 
theoretical insights that develop as data accrue (O’Reilly & Parker 2013). In this way, sample 
size is decided a posteriori. For some (e.g. Fusch & Ness, 2015), saturation is an essential 
element within qualitative research, implying that sample size should always be determined 
by this means.  
The present paper engages with the debate on these issues, but we adopt a broader 
critical overview of the literature, identifying four general approaches that have been taken 
towards determining qualitative sample size: 1. rules of thumb, based on a combination of 
methodological considerations and past experience; 2. conceptual models, based upon 
specific characteristics of the proposed study; 3. numerical guidelines derived from empirical 
investigation; and 4. statistical formulae, based on the probability of obtaining a sufficient 
sample size. We discuss these approaches in relation to the philosophical and methodological 
issues to which they give rise, ultimately arguing that each is underpinned by assumptions 
that are inherently problematic when applied to qualitative research, and in particular 
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inductive approaches in which themes1 are iteratively developed through the researcher’s 
ongoing engagement with the data. Through identifying, discussing and problematizing these 
varying approaches, this paper seeks to contribute novel insights to the ongoing discussion 
within the research literature, as well as potentially providing a resource for researchers who 
may be wrestling with decisions about sample size in their own qualitative studies. 
 
Approaches to determining sample size 
In this section, we describe in more detail – with examples – the four approaches alluded to 
above, as a basis for a critical, comparative discussion in subsequent sections. 
Rules of thumb 
A number of authors have proposed rules of thumb for sample size in qualitative research, 
based on methodological considerations and past experience with similar studies; this 
approach is reflected in one journal’s policy on sample size for grounded theory studies 
(Dworkin, 2012). Some such recommendations are collated in Table 1.2 These rules of thumb 
commonly lack a clear and detailed rationale, and whilst there is a degree of similarity in 
what they propose, there is also some diversity; for example, recommendations for grounded 
theory studies range from five to 35 and those for single case studies from four to 30. 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
Conceptual models 
Some authors have used a rather more formal conceptual model, based upon specific 
characteristics of the proposed study, such as its aim, its underlying theoretical framework, 
and the type of analysis intended. Morse (2000), for example, argues that sample size will 
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depend upon: the scope of the research question (the broader the scope, the larger the sample 
size needed); the nature of the topic (the more ‘obvious’, the smaller the sample size); the 
quality of the data (the richer the data, the smaller the sample size); the study design (a 
longitudinal design in which a group is the unit of analysis will require a smaller sample size 
than one in which there is one interview per participant); and shadowed data (if interviews 
reveal something about others’ perspectives, in addition to the interviewee’s own, this may 
require a smaller sample size).  
More recently, Malterud, Siersma and Guassora (2016) reason that sample size can be 
determined in relation to what they refer to as the ‘information power’ that a given sample 
holds.3 This information power is influenced by: the aim of the study (the broader the aim, 
the greater the required sample size); the specificity of the sample (the more specific the 
characteristics of the participants in relation to the study aims, the smaller the sample size); 
the theoretical background (the less developed the underlying theory, the greater the sample 
size); the quality of dialogue (the richer the dialogue in the interviews, the smaller the sample 
size); and the analysis strategy (a study aiming for an exploratory cross-case analysis will 
require a larger sample size than one aiming for in-depth analysis of a few informants). 
Numerical guidelines 
A third, and seemingly popular, approach to sample size employs numerical guidelines 
derived from empirical investigation. An early and influential study by Guest, Bunce and 
Johnson (2006) used 60 interviews from a phenomenological study of West African women; 
the authors determined the degree of saturation as it occurred during a process of thematic 
analysis. Saturation was considered to occur within 12 interviews, a figure they suggest could 
be used for future studies. More recently, Guest, Namey and McKenna (2017) have published 
6 
 
a similar paper on focus groups, concluding that 80% of all themes would emerge within two 
to three groups, and 90% within three to six groups. 
Francis et al (2010) reached conclusions on sample sizes required for saturation based 
on analysis of two previous studies. They defined an initial analysis sample of 10 interviews 
and a ‘stopping criterion’ for saturation of three, this criterion being defined as the number of 
additional interviews in which no new themes emerge. In the first study, of 14 interviews, 
they concluded that all of these interviews were required to achieve saturation, as the 
stopping criterion had not been met. In the second study, using the stopping criterion 
saturation was achieved after 15 of the 17 interviews. The authors are clear that their findings 
relate to ‘theory-based content analysis’, with a priori themes, and acknowledge that they 
may not apply to other approaches to analysis. 
Hennink, Kaiser and Marconi (2017) also consider sample size in relation to 
saturation, distinguishing between what they term ‘code saturation’ (where no additional 
issues are identified) and ‘meaning saturation’ (where no further insights are gained). They 
examined 25 transcripts of semi-structured interviews, to determine the point at which both 
code and meaning saturation occurred. In terms of code saturation, most codes (53%) were 
identified in the first interview analysed, and 91% by the sixth interview. The point of 
meaning saturation was defined in terms of the last interview in which a novel code 
‘dimension’ was identified. Meaning saturation was achieved earlier for codes representing 
concrete notions (normally by the ninth interview) whereas those representing more 
conceptual notions took longer (up to the 24th interview). 
Extending Guest et al’s (2006) work, Hagaman and Wutich (2017) focus on 
metathemes – which they define as themes that are cross-cultural rather than culture- or site-
specific. They analysed data from interviews with 132 respondents from 4 sites, yielding 240 
7 
 
site-specific themes and 9 cross-cultural metathemes. Sixteen or fewer interviews were 
sufficient to identify common themes from sites with homogeneous groups, but 20–40 were 
needed to achieve saturation for metathemes. They specifically focused on themes across, 
rather than within, participants. 
Finally, Ando, Cousins and Young (2014) examine saturation in the context of 
thematic analysis. In a two-stage process, codes were identified by inductive analysis of six 
interview transcripts (creating a codebook), and the resulting 39 codes, in seven themes, were 
then applied to the remaining 33 interview transcripts (resulting in some modifications to the 
number, definitions and labels of codes). The authors concluded that 12 interviews (six from 
the first stage and six from the second stage) provided all the themes and over 90% of codes, 
and recommended this as a sufficient sample size for thematic analysis with ‘higher level 
concepts’. 
Statistical formulae 
At least five studies have used statistical formulae to determine sample size a priori, based on 
the probability of obtaining a sufficient sample size. A study that has promoted much 
discussion is that by Fugard and Potts (2015a), who present tables based on a binomial 
distribution4 to show the minimum number of participants needed in order to detect, with a 
stated level of confidence (e.g. 80%), a given number of instances of a theme with an 
assumed prevalence in the population of interest. 
Adopting a similar approach, Galvin (2015) utilizes the binomial distribution to i) 
calculate the probability that a theme with a given prevalence in the population will emerge at 
least once in a given number of interviews, or alternatively ii) calculate the number of 
interviews required for 95% probability of such a theme emerging at least once.  
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Van Rijnsoever (2015) uses simulations to determine the minimum number of 
informants (or, in his words, ‘information sources’) needed to achieve saturation. The 
addition of each informant is described as a ‘sampling step’. Three scenarios are considered: 
random chance (where no prior information is used in successive sampling steps), minimal 
information (at each step, the researcher actively seeks an informant that will reveal at least 
one new code), and maximum information (at each step, the researcher seeks an informant 
that will lead to the largest possible increase in observed codes). This process is based upon 
knowledge of both the number of codes in the population and the probability of observing a 
code. If, for example, there are 101 codes in the population and the average probability of 
observing such a code is less than 10%, the random chance scenario required more than 1000 
informants (in 95% of the simulations) to achieve saturation, whereas the minimal 
information and maximum information scenarios required 46 and 20 informants, respectively. 
Finally, a study by Tran, Porcher, Falissard and Ravaud (2016) uses Monte-Carlo 
simulations5 on an existing dataset of open-ended survey responses to determine the 
probability of identifying at least one new theme for each additional participant. A total of 
150 participants allowed 92% of themes in the original study to be identified. A subsequent 
study from this group (Tran, Porcher, Tran & Ravaud, 2017) uses similar methodology to 
derive mathematical models to identify a ‘point of saturation’ that represents a desirable 
balance between the number of themes identified and the number of participants.6  
 
Philosophical and methodological issues 
The practical imperative to predetermine sample size a priori is understandable. However, it 
is important to consider the ontological and/or epistemological assumptions that are made in 
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the process and the methodological validity and coherence of strategies such as those outlined 
above.  
Ontological status of a theme 
Studies that rely on statistical formulae (e.g. Fugard & Potts, 2015a) or that otherwise arrive 
at predicted numbers of interviews at which saturation will occur (e.g. Francis et al, 2010) 
make a naïve realist assumption – i.e. that themes ‘pre-exist’ in participants’ accounts, 
independently of the analyst, and are there to be discovered.7 This emerges strongly in some 
of the language used. For example, van Rijnsoever (2015) suggests that a population will 
‘contain’ codes and that information is ‘extracted’ from informants. He also refers to the 
possibility of codes ‘becoming observed’ or, alternatively, of being ‘missed’, similarly 
suggesting that codes have an objective existence, prior to the process of data collection. 
Fugard and Potts (2015a) – as Braun and Clarke (2016) point out – use similar language 
when referring to ‘capturing’ a theme.  
This ontological assumption sits uneasily with perspectives that are more commonly 
associated with qualitative research, such as subtle realism (Hammersley, 1992) and 
constructionism (Gergen, 2001; Best, 2008). Subtle realism accepts that social phenomena 
and processes are ‘real’ in terms of having an independent existence from those who observe 
them, and are thereby in principle ‘knowable’, but denies that they are directly accessible 
through observation. Instead, they emerge from the engagement of the researcher with the 
data, and are therefore mediated by the researcher’s prior cultural and theoretical 
understanding. Constructionism, meanwhile, takes a more clearly anti-realist stance, arguing 
that ‘all claims to the “real” are traced to processes of relationship, and there is no extra-
cultural means of ultimately privileging one construction of reality over another’ (Gergen, 
2001, p. 8). Accordingly, on this view social phenomena have no objective existence in the 
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external world, but are co-produced by analyst and informant. In neither perspective is a 
theme something to be ‘discovered’. 
These statistical and numerical approaches similarly assume that occurrences of a 
theme are fungible – they are deemed equivalent and interchangeable, regardless of the 
particular informant’s account from which they may be generated, rather than as deriving 
their meaning and importance at least partly from the individuality of a person’s account and 
the context in which it is set. In this way, data are decontextualized from participants’ 
specific experiences or biographies, contrary to the spirit and mission of much qualitative 
research. 
Linked to this, as Byrne (2015) points out in relation to Fugard and Potts’ (2015a) 
paper, is a view of a theme as being in some sense an attribute of an individual. A one-to-one 
relationship appears to be posited between the participant and the theme, much as a 
respondent might be represented by a value on a particular variable in a more quantitative 
approach to research. Similarly, when Tran et al (2016, p. 91) suggest that ‘enriching an 
initial sample with patients representing different characteristics would improve the number 
of themes identified,’ the implication is that particular themes are directly generated by 
specific, identifiable characteristics of members of the sample, or possibly by definable 
subgroups of the sample. This understanding seems closer to a survey approach to research 
than a form of qualitative research in which participants exemplify, but are not reducible to, 
more abstract theoretical constructs, and in which such constructs are not generated by, or 
otherwise ‘tied’ to, individual attributes. In a similar way, any approach that attempts to 
determine sampling a priori in terms of the number of participants is liable to overemphasize 
the individual as the relevant unit. As Sandelowski (1995) points out, sample size can be 
thought of in terms of the number of events, incidents and experiences, not solely in terms of 
the number of participants. Accordingly, her recommendations regarding sample size make 
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reference to the number of descriptions of an experience rather than simply the number of 
informants. Adaptive sampling decisions based on saturation can accommodate these 
differing types of data, but strategies that predetermine a sample size purely in terms of the 
number of individual informants would struggle to do so. 
Themes as ‘instances’ 
When it is specified that a number of occurrences of a theme can be identified with a given 
level of confidence (e.g. Fugard & Potts, 2015a) or that a given number of interviews would 
be required in order to achieve saturation (e.g. Guest et al, 2006), an assumption is made that 
how a theme is defined is constant throughout the study, and that on this basis occurrences of 
a theme can be enumerated in a straightforward manner. However, what is considered to be 
an ‘instance’ of a theme might change over the process of data collection and analysis in line 
with changes in the researcher’s understanding of the underlying theoretical concept that 
occur as insights develop. Furthermore, the extent to which a particular theme is considered 
to be important or relevant may change as data accumulate during a study (Kerr, Nixon & 
Wild, 2010; Emmel, 2013; Hammersley, 2015).  
Accumulating instances of a theme do not, therefore, contribute information or 
insights to the researcher in a consistent or linear way. Accordingly, an attempt to predict the 
point of saturation cannot be tied down to the number of interviews in which a theme occurs, 
as it will also depend on the way in which, and the degree to which, each occurrence of a 
theme in successive interviews informs and modifies a deeper conceptual understanding of 
the theme concerned. As Becker (2012, p.15) notes, ‘the number of interviews you need will 
change from day to day as you learn more and revise your ideas’. Hammersley (2015, p. 688) 
also points out that the qualitative researcher’s focus is often not so much on how many 
informants are sampled, but on which informants are sampled, in terms of the ‘fruitful 
12 
 
development of the emerging theory.’ Hence, the development of a nuanced analysis depends 
upon how accumulating occurrences (and accompanying variations) of a theme assist in 
providing theoretical insights. Some accounts will contribute more to this process than others, 
and aiming only for a number of such accounts is therefore inadequate as a basis for 
determining sample size.  
Statistical approaches to sample size calculation, and those such as Francis et al’s 
(2010) that are centred on the empirical determination of saturation, focus explicitly on the 
number of instances of a theme. In the first case, the focus is on the number of participants 
required to identify at least one occurrence of a theme, whilst in the second it is on the 
number of interviews required in order to identify no additional such occurrences. Themes 
are thereby conceptualized only at the level of instances, rather than in the context of a 
broader analytical framework in which the concern would be not only with enumerable 
instances of a theme, but also with the way in which meaning is developed within a theme, 
and through the relationship between themes. For example, taking a grounded theory 
approach in a study of chronic pain, Howell (1994) describes the progressive development of 
analytical categories through the process of analysis, from more descriptive lower-order 
categories to more abstract higher-order categories. In contrast, statistical approaches appear 
to operate solely at the level of lower-order, descriptive themes and do not take account of the 
further development or elaboration of higher-order themes during analysis. Hence, the more 
that themes are regarded as holding interpretive, rather than descriptive, meaning, the less 
applicable will be an approach to sample size conceived in terms of instances.8 
A further implication of statistical and empirical approaches to sample size is that the 
possibility of identifying instances of a theme is taken to be the same across members of the 
sample. If a specific number of participants is stated in advance of data collection in order to 
identify a theme, or a particular number of themes, with a stated degree of probability, it is 
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assumed that an occurrence of each theme can potentially be derived from each participant’s 
account. However, this assumption will not necessarily apply in qualitative research. It is 
quite possible that some lower-order themes will be potentially identifiable in the accounts of 
some participants but may be extremely unlikely to occur in others. For example, in a study 
of physical activity and chronic pain, Richardson, Moore, Bernard, Jordan and Sim (2015) 
interviewed individuals who had either no pain, pain that did not interfere with their lives, or 
pain that did interfere. Themes relating to physical activity, social activity and a notion of 
‘involvement’ were more commonly exemplified in the accounts of informants reporting pain 
without interference than in those informants reporting pain with interference. Only if one 
assumes a certain commonality of experience or perspective can one regard all participants as 
potentially contributing to a pre-identified theme.9 
The analytical context 
One of the most striking methodological aspects of many attempts to determine sample size a 
priori is their reliance on a deductive approach to analysis; i.e. one that relies wholly or 
predominantly on applying pre-identified themes to the data, rather than allowing these to 
emerge inductively.10 Indeed, Francis et al (2010) are clear that their method is intended to 
apply to theory-driven themes.11 This approach may lend itself, at least partially, to a method 
such as framework analysis (Ritchie & Spencer 1994), in which some or all themes are 
determined ahead of data analysis, or more broadly any approach in which a coding scheme 
is generated in the first few interviews and then applied to the analysis of subsequent 
interviews, as in Guest et al’s (2006) and Ando et al’s (2014) studies. However, attempts to 
pre-specify sample size – in other than a purely pragmatic way – in advance for a study in 
which analysis is intended to be inductive is essentially contradictory. If an understanding of 
the number and the nature of themes proceeds pari passu with the process of analysis, one 
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cannot meaningfully predict at the outset the point at which this understanding will be 
adequate. 
The conceptual models of Morse (2000) and Malterud et al (2016), which stress the 
particular characteristics of individual studies as crucial to adequate sample size, avoid many 
of the shortcomings or questionable assumptions associated with the more empirical 
approaches. Thus, Malterud et al (2016) reject the use of formulae to calculate sample size in 
qualitative research, and acknowledge that initial assessments of sample size should be 
revisited during a study. However, there are other respects in which this conceptual approach 
is questionable. A basic premise of Malterud et al’s (2016, p. 1754) model is that ‘tools to 
guide sample size should not rely on procedures from a specific analysis method, but rest on 
shared methodological principles’. First, this claim is contestable. As a method of analysis 
will be at least partly determined by the nature of the research question, which will in turn be 
based on a particular philosophical perspective, it is likely that sample size will be related to 
particular analytical procedures. For example, adopting an approach based on interpretive 
phenomenological analysis, with its focus on cases (Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 2009), may 
have very different implications for sample size from one based on qualitative content 
analysis (Granaheim and Lundman, 2004; Schreier, 2014), or one based on conversation 
analysis (Grundy, 2008; Clift, 2016). This point can be illustrated further by focusing on 
Morse’s (2000) discussion of shadowed data as a determinant of sample size. Shadowed data 
occur when: 
‘[i]n addition to talking about their own experience, participants may discuss the experience 
of others, how their experience resembles or differs from others, and why… The use of 
shadowed data… provides the investigator with some idea of the range of experiences and 
the domain of the phenomena beyond the single person’s individual experience, and it 
provides some explanation of the rationale for these differences’. (Morse, 2000, p. 4) 
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The way in which, and the extent to which, such shadowed data will influence sample size is 
not straightforward, and will depend upon the specific approach to analysis that is 
undertaken. If, in the context of an ethnographic study, analysis is directed at understanding 
how individuals contribute to and partake of a particular culture or set of social practices, 
there is a sense (albeit limited, perhaps) in which one person’s account may tell us something 
about the experiences of others and the way in which these differ, and thereby influence the 
sample size. In contrast, an analysis founded on more phenomenological principles may 
simply regard an informant’s discussion of others’ experiences as elaborating that 
individual’s own particular perspective, rather than providing insight into what others 
experience or perceive. The effect on sample size is very different in each case. In the 
ethnographic approach, shadowed data may affect sample size in terms of the number of 
different perspectives that are represented in the data, whereas in the phenomenological 
approach the effect on sample size is mediated through the richness of the data obtained from 
an individual informant. 
Second, the insistence on ‘shared methodological principles’ suggests a form of 
methodological unity that sits uneasily within qualitative research. Malterud et al (2016) 
seem to assume that the various dimensions of ‘information power’, and hence of sample 
size, operate in a uniform and predictable way. No doubt there is a tendency for a study with 
broad aims to require a larger sample than one with narrower aims, but is this a matter of 
necessity? Might it not have to do with the nature of these aims, rather than just their 
breadth? It is argued that ‘a researcher who never challenges his or her participant runs the 
risk of developing empirical data holding low information power, which, during analysis, 
only reproduces what is known from before’ (Malterud et al, 2016, p. 1756). This seems to be 
a very broad claim, and assumes a false orthodoxy in interviewing. In a narrative approach to 
interviewing, for example, a technique of challenging might be inimical, rather than 
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conducive, to obtaining insightful data. For example, it would sit uneasily within the 
‘receptive’ approach to narrative interviewing described by Wengraf (2009), which is 
characterized by minimal intervention on the part of the researcher, so as to permit the 
informant to unfold his or her story freely and spontaneously. Here, following a single initial 
question, any interventions by the researcher are ‘effectively limited to facilitative noises and 
non-verbal support’ (Wengraf, 2009, p. 113). This non-directive style of narrative interview 
is also reflected in Chase’s (2005) characterization of the research relationship as one of 
narrator and listener, rather than informant and interviewer. 
The way in which adequacy of sample size is conceptualized can also suggest an 
approach to analysis that has little resonance with qualitative research. The focus on 
instances, discussed earlier, encourages an undue emphasis on a process of enumeration in 
qualitative data analysis. Admittedly, authors such as Silverman (1985) and Dey (1993) have 
argued convincingly that deriving theoretical insights from qualitative data may at times 
depend upon some form of basic quantification. Dey (1993, p. 179), for example, maintains 
that ‘it is difficult to see how, in practice, it is possible to identify associations between 
categories or to assess the strength of relationships without recourse to a numerical 
evaluation’. However, it is hard to see this type of enumeration as playing more than an 
ancillary role in qualitative data analysis. As argued earlier, a meaningful analysis will 
ultimately depend upon the nature and meaning of concepts expressed in the data, not their 
prevalence, frequency or typicality. Moreover, it is dangerous to equate the number of 
instances straightforwardly with some measure of analytical importance, as van Rijnsoever 
(2015, p. 12) appears to when suggesting that ‘to enhance the credibility of the research, it is 
possible to aim deliberately for a minimum number of observations of each code.’ 
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Diversity of the participants 
Some of the rules of thumb in Table 1 refer to the notion of homogeneity, suggesting that this 
may influence the required sample size. It is indeed reasonable to think that sampling in 
qualitative research needs to take account of the differing characteristics, or the diversity of 
experience, in those who are the focus of the study, and that the greater their supposed 
heterogeneity, the larger the number of participants that should be included. On occasions, 
this way of thinking may inform a priori judgments. A study intending to explore how the 
experience of an illness is gendered may, for example, foresee analytical comparisons 
between men’s and women’s perspectives and determine the number of informants 
accordingly. Equally, and perhaps more likely, a sense of heterogeneity may emerge from 
participants’ accounts during the process of data analysis, and may appropriately inform the 
number of participants sampled in line with the principles of theoretical sampling (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967).  
In both cases, however, what underlies this consideration is not some notion of 
empirical representativeness – as might be the case in survey research – but rather a concern 
‘to generate a full range of variation in the set of descriptions to be used in analysing a 
phenomenon’ (Polkinghorne, 1989, p. 48). The homogeneity of the sample does not, 
therefore, drive sample size in the same way as in quantitative research, where the principal 
concern is with minimizing random sampling error (Barnett, 2002). 
Determinants of sample size as interdependent 
Malterud et al’s (2016) and Morse’s (2000) models present the various determinants of 
sample size as if they operate independently and thus summatively. Hence, Malterud et al 
(2016, p. 1756) argue: 
18 
 
A study will need the least amount of participants when the study aim is narrow, if the 
combination of participants is highly specific for the study aim, if it is supported by 
established theory, if the interview dialogue is strong, and if the analysis includes 
longitudinal in-depth exploration of narratives or discourse details.12 
It is, however, conceivable that in some instances these determinants will interact. Hence, the 
factors influencing sample size may well not be independent, and the extent to which one 
particular dimension is present in a study will influence the extent to which some or all of the 
others influence the required sample size. Morse (2000, pp. 3–4) considers separately the 
effect of the scope of the study (‘the broader the scope of the research question, the longer it 
will take to reach saturation’) and the effect of the topic of the study (‘If the topic being 
studied is obvious and clear, and the information is easily obtained in the interviews, then 
fewer participants are needed than if the topic is below the surface and intriguing and difficult 
to grab’). However, a study whose scope is broad may conceivably address either an obvious 
topic or one that is below the surface, as may one whose scope is narrower. The effect of the 
scope of the study cannot therefore be considered separately from that of the topic – and how, 
and to what extent, this occurs cannot be readily judged in advance of undertaking the study. 
Consequently, it may not be realistic to rely on generic determinants of sample size – except 
as very provisional guidance or as ‘springboards’ for one’s thinking (Bryman, 2012, p. 19) – 
but instead take a more particularistic focus on the specific characteristics in the study at 
hand, and the way in which these inter-relate. 
Statistical assumptions 
If we turn to the approaches that employ statistical methods to calculate sample size, these 
make a number of specific assumptions. First, as part of the probabilistic model they assume 
that occurrences of a theme are statistically independent – i.e. that the identification of a 
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theme in the account of one informant does not influence, and is not influenced by, its 
occurrence in any other informant. This is unlikely to be the case. As suggested earlier, 
within a study a theme may be more likely to arise from the accounts of certain informants 
than of certain other informants. For example, in a study conducted within a particular 
community or organization, particular relationships or shared experiences involving a number 
of participants may suggest that the accounts of these particular individuals will evoke similar 
concepts. The statistical basis of the sample size calculation will be affected accordingly. In a 
similar way, if a process of snowball sampling is adopted – as commonly occurs in 
qualitative research (Noy, 2008) – the use of social networks or prior relationships to identify 
additional informants almost guarantees that themes will not be independent. Additionally, 
interest may centre on how a theme is repeatedly exemplified by an individual informant’s 
account, not merely with the presence of themes across accounts – these occurrences within 
an informant will similarly not be independent.  
Second, these statistical calculations rely upon a posited underlying probability 
distribution, such as the binomial distribution. So, if a theme is considered to have a 
prevalence of 15% in the population, and the researcher wishes to be 95% confident of 
finding at least one occurrence of this theme, the following formula (where ‘ln’ denotes 
natural logarithm) will provide the minimum number of informants required (Viechtbauer et 
al, 2015): 
 
 
ln 1 .95
19
ln 1 .15
n
   
A consequence of this is that the sample of informants in any study based on such a 
calculation should reflect this hypothesized probability distribution. If, however, the actual 
prevalence differs from that assumed, the calculation of the minimum number of informants 
will not be valid – e.g. if the prevalence of the theme is actually 10% rather than 15%, the 
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appropriate number of informants would be 29. Furthermore, using a hypothesized 
distribution requires a random sampling procedure. Not only is random sampling 
impracticable in most qualitative research, but a notable drawback is that such a prescribed 
method also rules out any form of sampling – such as purposive (Mason, 2002) or theoretical 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967) sampling – that adjusts the selection of cases adaptively during 
analysis in relation to developing insights or other emergent features of the study.  
Directly linked to this is a third assumption: that the prevalence of a theme (e.g. 
Fugard & Potts, 2015a; Galvin, 2015) and/or the number of themes (e.g. van Rijnsoever, 
2015) can be estimated at the outset. This is probably only possible with clearly defined a 
priori themes within a deductive framework, and certainly not in an inductive approach to 
analysis. In the latter, not only are themes liable to be unknown at the outset, but any that are 
known will be subject to refinement or re-definition as the study proceeds, largely precluding 
any prior sense of their prevalence.  
An assumption of generality 
Statistical approaches to sample size assume that the basis on which the calculation is made – 
e.g. the prevalence of a theme – should be transferable to the context of a new study. 
Moreover, when Fugard and Potts (2015a, p. 671) note that ‘for any given study, the 
saturation point may vary, making planning difficult’, they see this as a problem to be 
overcome, rather than as a reflection of the individuality of specific studies. 
This notion of generality also underlies some of the other approaches that have been 
considered. Establishing guidelines on the basis of past experience with ‘similar’ studies runs 
the risk of assuming a false homogeneity among studies, even with the same methodological 
or analytical tradition. Studies carried out from the perspective of interpretative 
phenomenological analysis, for example, will clearly have something in common, but there is 
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a danger of overstating their similarity and overlooking the unique features of individual 
studies, in response to which an apparently equivalent methodology may take quite a 
different form or emphasis. Similarly, empirical studies, such as those by Ando et al (2014), 
Francis et al (2010) and Guest et al (2006, 2016), are conducted in particular contexts, with 
specific samples: Ando et al (2014) interviewed individuals with multiple sclerosis, whilst 
Guest et al (2006) used data from sex workers in Africa. The generality of the figures they 
derive for sample size may therefore be limited (as the authors often admit), and this 
undercuts their usefulness in relation to future studies in which the topic, context or 
population of the study may differ. Moreover, this is not just a matter of generalizability. 
Ignoring the unique features of a particular study goes against the contextual orientation of 
most qualitative research.  
 
Discussion 
It is not difficult to understand the desire of many researchers undertaking qualitative 
research to pursue methods for determining sample size a priori, given requirements of 
funding bodies, the practicalities of managing time and resources, and perhaps, amongst 
some, a desire to reduce the perceived ‘messiness’ of subjective judgements about sampling 
by introducing a degree of standardization. We have critiqued four main approaches to 
determining sample size identified in the literature. We have argued that what appears 
common to all of these different approaches are problematic assumptions of uniformity 
across different qualitative methods.  
Both statistical approaches to determining sample size and empirically-derived 
guidelines appear to suggest a degree of uniformity in the identification of a theme, in terms 
of the assumption of a direct relationship between the number of participants and the number 
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of identified instances of a theme. In such approaches, the number of instances of a theme 
appears to be most significant, rather than the theoretical insights these instances offer in 
relation to the theme concerned. We have argued that such models appear more suited to 
deductive approaches to analysis in which themes are predefined, and appear somewhat 
incompatible with more exploratory, inductive approaches in which sampling decisions are 
guided by a principle such as saturation.  
 Conceptual model approaches such as that proposed by Malterud et al (2016) are 
perhaps more suited to an inductive methodology – they argue that judgments on sample size 
‘should be stepwise revisited along the research process and not definitely decided in 
advance’ (2016, p. 1757). However, the model they propose does not elaborate on this idea, 
and an assessment of the ‘information power’ of a sample from the initial point of designing 
the study does appear to place more emphasis on a priori decision-making, even if such 
decisions are not set in stone. Malterud et al (2016) also make the questionable assumption of 
a degree of standardization across qualitative methods – that there is a set of shared principles 
spanning different study designs and analytic frameworks. Additionally, like statistical 
formulae and empirically-derived guidelines, the notion of ‘information power’ appears, 
albeit implicitly, to adopt a realist assumption that data are somehow extracted from 
participants, suggesting the incremental gaining of objective information – an 
epistemological stance we have proposed is at odds with approaches that consider themes as 
being developed as part of an ongoing, interpretive analysis. Many of these approaches also 
assume a questionable homogeneity across studies – even within an identified 
methodological approach, as in the case of approaches based on rules of thumb – leading to 
an excessively generalist approach to sample size recommendations or calculations. 
Researchers – particularly those working at the interpretive end of the spectrum of 
qualitative research – face a genuine challenge when seeking to justify sample sizes to 
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funding bodies or ethical review committees. However, resorting to predictions or 
calculations that rest upon questionable assumptions, or that import inappropriate 
methodological or statistical principles from quantitative research, is an ill-advised response 
to this challenge. A preferable approach would be, perhaps, to address the pragmatic 
necessity of providing some indication of sample size by presenting an approximate, and very 
provisional, anticipated upper limit, without presenting an unwarranted empirical basis for 
such a figure or attempting precise predictions of a point of saturation, but with a clear caveat 
that a firm judgment of the number of participants ultimately required can only be reached 
once the study is underway. This can be further justified by including a clear explanation of 
how an adaptive approach to sample size fits with the inductive methodology adopted in the 
study, as well as an outline of how sample size decisions will be made during the course of 
the study – for example, the way in which saturation will be assessed and demonstrated in the 
research – thereby providing a rationale underpinned by clear methodological reasoning.  
Whilst in this paper we have focused principally on sample size in relation to 
interview studies – reflecting the majority of literature in this field ‒ we might propose that 
similar arguments be put to funding bodies and ethics committees regarding other methods of 
qualitative data collection; for instance, observation, diaries and visual methods. Although the 
nature of sampling decisions may be very different across these methods, much the same 
logic must hold that sampling decisions should be principally driven by methodological 
considerations over and above practical imperatives. Closer attention to sampling decisions in 
relation to these other types of qualitative data could be a fruitful area for further research. 
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Conclusion 
On this evidence, we believe that defining sample size a priori is inherently problematic in 
the case of inductive, exploratory research, which, by definition, looks to explore phenomena 
in relation to which we cannot identify the key themes in advance. In such an approach, 
specifying a priori how many participants will be needed to create sufficient understanding 
of what is as yet unknown is, in its essence, illogical (Saunders et al, 2017). Thus, whilst we 
acknowledge the practical imperative to give a rough estimation of sample size at the 
beginning of a study, we argue that the decision over what constitutes an adequate sample 
size to meet a study’s aims is one that is necessarily a process of ongoing interpretation by 
the researcher. It is an iterative, context-dependent decision made during the analytical 
process as the researcher begins to develop an increasingly comprehensive picture of the 
developed themes, the relationship between these themes, and where the conceptual 
boundaries of these themes lie.  
Moreover, although there is clearly a need to make a decision on the number of 
participants in a study by one means or another – whether through a priori determination or a 
more adaptive approach such as saturation – there is also a need to ensure that the whole 
issue of sample size does not assume a disproportionate prominence and overshadow other 
essential elements with the process of qualitative data collection and analysis. As Emmel 
(2013, p. 154) reminds us, ‘it is not the number of cases that matters, it is what you do with 
them that counts.’ 
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1 We use this term broadly, to embrace ‘codes’, ‘categories’, and similar terms. 
2 Some such recommendations relate not to the number of informants but to the number of interviews with an 
individual informant. For example, Spradley (1979:51) recommends at least six to seven one-hour interviews for 
an ethnographic study. 
3 Although these authors indicate that their model applies to the planning of a study, it is not solely focussed on 
the prior determination of sample size; they note that the adequacy of the sample size should be continuously 
reassessed during a study. 
4 The binomial distribution is a probability distribution used for binary variables, i.e. those in which an 
observation can take one of two possible values, such as ‘present’ versus ‘absent’. 
5 Monte Carlo simulations estimate the sampling distribution of a particular statistic by drawing numerous 
random samples from a stimulated population of values (Mooney, 2004). 
6 More specifically, a theme accumulation curve was constructed, such that a value of 0.05 for this curve (i.e. 
one new theme for each 20 additional participants) allowed 97.5% of themes to be identified whilst limiting the 
inclusion of further participants who would not yield further themes; this was proposed as a possible stopping 
criterion for sampling. 
7 Interestingly, an early example of this approach (Romney, Weller and Batchelder 1986) focused on calculating 
the number of participants in terms of investigating their knowledge – the truth or falsity of their responses to 
specific questions. Moving from this to matters of belief or experience, on which qualitative research 
characteristically focuses, is questionable. 
8 Hagaman and Wutich (2017) are, however, explicit that their themes are descriptive. 
9 Higher-order themes, owing to their greater theoretical abstraction and the fact that they are likely to subsume 
a number of lower-order themes, might be more readily assumed to encompass most or all accounts. However, 
these numerical and statistical approaches to sample size tend to focus on lower-order themes. 
10 The identification of themes by an inductive process is most commonly associated with grounded theory 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Initially, the process of analysis in grounded theory is indeed inductive, but as 
theoretical categories evolve, a more abductive logic is employed whereby instances of data are related to the 
theoretical category with which they best fit (Charmaz, 2009), thereby allowing these categories to be further 
developed and refined. Accordingly, we are using ‘inductive’ in a broad rather than a narrow sense.  
11 Curiously, despite proposing that codes can be foreknown in terms of their number and probability of 
occurrence, van Rijnsoever (2015) sets his approach within an inductive approach, aligned with the principles of 
grounded theory. 
12 Malterud et al (2016:1754) acknowledge that the determinants may have a ‘mutual impact on each other’, but 
this is not explicated within the model that they propose. 
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Table 1. Rules of thumb for sample size 
Author(s) Recommendation 
Adler and Adler (2012) Recommend a ‘broad range of between a dozen and 60, with 30 being 
the mean’ (p. 10). 
Bernard (2000, 2013) Bernard (2000) recommends 30–60 for ethnographic studies. 
Elsewhere (Bernard, 2013, p. 175), he suggests that ‘10–20 
knowledgeable people are enough to uncover and understand the core 
categories in any well-defined cultural domain or study of lived 
experience’. 
Boddy (2005) Suggests an upper limit of 12 focus groups or 30 in-depth interviews, if 
researching a relatively homogeneous population. 
Creswell (2013) Recommends 20 to 30 informants for a grounded theory study, 4 to 5 
cases per study for case study research, and 2 or 3 for narrative 
research. 
Dukes (1984) Recommends 3 to 10 participants in a phenomenological study. 
Kuzel (1999) Recommends 5 to 8 participants in a homogeneous sample (or 
homogeneous subgroups within a sample) or 12 to 20 if looking for 
disconfirming evidence or to achieve maximum variation sampling. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985 
p235) 
Recommend between 12 and 20 participants in interview studies. 
Marshall, Cardon, 
Poddar and Fontenot 
(2013) 
Recommend 20 to 30 interviews for grounded theory studies and 15 to 
30 for single case studies. 
Morse (1994, 2000) Morse (1994) recommends at least 6 participants for phenomenological 
studies and approximately 35 for studies based in grounded theory, 
ethnography and ethnoscience. Morse (2000) gives similar figures, 
pointing out that the number of interviews per informant is important, 
as well as the number of informants. 
Onwuegbuzie and Leech 
(2007) 
Do not recommend specific numbers, but advocate examining sample 
sizes in previous studies of similar design in which saturation was 
reached and using a figure within the range of such sample sizes. 
Parse (2009) Recommends 2 to 10 participants in order to achieve ‘redundancy or 
saturation’ (p. 10). 
Ray (1994) Suggests that phenomenological studies usually focus on a group of 
between 8 and 12 people, but may also focus on just a single person (p. 
127). 
Ritchie, Lewis, Elam, 
Tennant and Rahim 
(2014) 
Advise an upper limit of 50 for interview studies, on the basis that the 
quality of data collection and analysis may suffer with larger studies (p. 
118). 
Smith, Flowers and 
Larkin (2009) 
Advise between 3 and 10 for studies based on interpretative 
phenomenological analysis, but indicate that the appropriate sample 
size depends on a number of factors specific to the study concerned, 
including level of study for student work (undergraduate, 
postgraduate). 
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Corbin and Strauss 
(2015) 
Propose at least five one-hour interviews for theoretical saturation in 
grounded theory studies. 
Warren (2002) Suggests that the norm in terms of the minimum number of interviews 
is in the range of 20–30 in order to ‘have a nonethnographic interview 
study published’ (p. 99). 
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